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By Marcel van Rinsum
company would receive in rebates from 
suppliers. In other words, a scandal in-
volving aggressive accounting.4
The Financial Times credit card story 
described interest-free credit cards as a 
ticking time bomb as banks apparently 
routinely expected eventual future in-
come in the here and now.5
The details and complexity differ 
from case to case but the motives are 
often staggeringly simple. Two kinds 
of aggressive accounting can be char-
acterised briefly; both take conscious 
management to the boundaries of 
what is reasonable. On the one hand, 
there is an opportunistic attempt to 
generate an over-optimistic financial 
result. This can be achieved by booking 
anticipated income at the earliest pos-
sible time in the product life cycle or 
by delaying the recording of losses to 
the latest possible moment. In earlier 
separate research, we have seen this 
take place to trigger bonus payments 
to senior management.
On the other hand, and equally op-
portunistic, if management sees that 
a significant loss is inevitable in a giv-
en accounting period, they might be 
tempted to exaggerate the loss attrib-
utable to that period by making exces-
This last element is at the core of a pa-
per – Disclosure Checklists and Auditors’ 
Judgments of Aggressive Accounting – I 
co-authored and which was published 
in March of this year. I will discuss the 
content of the paper in more detail lat-
er, but for now will try to tease out and 
communicate some of the key lessons 
that might interest a wider audience.
The pages of corporate history are 
littered with examples of aggressive 
accounting, featuring such landmark 
events as British & Commonwealth's 
(B&C) ill-fated purchase of Atlantic 
Computers and Hewlett Packard's 
(HP) eerily similar purchase of UK 
software firm Autonomy more than 20 
years later. 
Much more recently UK retailer 
Tesco overstated profits in at least 
three financial years: aggressive ac-
counting. In April this year the Financial 
Times published a story strongly sug-
gesting that UK credit card lenders 
might be carrying on the tradition. And 
the failure of Enron in 2001 provides a 
spectacular textbook example of what 
can happen when an auditor fails to 
identify serious misstatements.1
In 1988, B&C acquired Atlantic 
Computers plc for £434 million, subse-
quent to a series of market purchases 
that built up their stake in that compa-
ny. The acquisition destroyed B&C, as 
Atlantic had been booking profits that 
did not exist: aggressive accounting.2
In October 2011, HP bought 
Autonomy in a deal that valued the tar-
get at US$11.1 billion, widely described 
as a huge premium. Just over a year 
later, HP wrote off around 75 per cent 
of its investment as it became more fa-
miliar with the aggressive accounting 
practices of its new acquisition.3
In October 2014, Tesco reported 
a 92 per cent fall in profits after writ-
ing off £263 million. It transpired that 
Tesco managers had been over-op-
timistic in estimating how much the 
“Our research strongly suggests that certain 
measures taken to improve the accuracy 
of account reporting can in fact have an 
adverse impact…”
How do you solve a problem like aggressive accounting? With some 
difficulty, some management teams and their external auditors might 
argue. Especially if they cannot agree on: (a) just what constitutes 
aggressive accounting; (b) whether or not aggressive accounting is 
inherently a bad thing, and (c) whether it manifests itself more in one 
kind of management/auditor relationship than it does in another.
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Our findings have important im-
plications for auditing practice. First, 
when designing their audit proce-
dures, audit firms need to be aware 
that downsides exist in the use of dis-
closure checklists. Although feeling 
accountable to management by itself 
has no effect on auditors’ acceptance 
of aggressive accounting, the use of 
mechanistic checklists can reduce 
the extent to which auditors remain 
critical towards their clients. Pro-
client bias then looms, thus present-
ing a subtle yet significant threat to 
auditor independence.
sive provisions. When carried out by 
new management following the re-
placement of a discredited manage-
ment team, this is often referred to as 
“deep sixing”.
Unless disaster strikes in the next 
accounting period, they should be able 
to draw on those excess provisions to 
restore profits. This would have the 
added benefit of painting a flattering 
picture of their management capabili-
ties. But it would represent recovery 
from an artificially low base.
Disclosure checklists
In our joint paper, we set out to inves-
tigate whether the use of a disclosure 
checklist affects the attitude of the au-
ditor to the company that is paying for 
the audit, nudging the auditor in the 
direction of glossing over the use of 
aggressive accounting. Our results im-
ply that the use of a disclosure check-
list does indeed result in a less critical 
state of mind. 
Auditors, like any human, can suf-
fer from unconscious biases and re-
spond to incentives – just as man-
agement does – but without realising 
it. When this happens, the watch-
dog can become less sceptical and 
too easily acquiesce to perceived 
management pressure.
In an ideal world, accountants 
would ask penetrating questions to 
establish underlying facts before 
compiling the definitive accounts. 
Unfortunately, the real world doesn't 
always work like that. The real world in-
stead too often places undue emphasis 
on regulation, replication and stand-
ardisation. And as referred to earlier, 
making the process over-mechanical 
affects the mindset of the auditor.
The use of a checklist inspires a box-
ticking mentality rather than a critical 
mentality. This is especially true in cas-
es where the auditor feels accountable 
to a management team with a vest-
ed interest in a beneficial outcome. 
Auditors will tend to give the benefit 
of the doubt to management and go 
along with their aggressive accounting 
methods, after being lulled into a false 
sense of security by the basic checklist. 
The glass will tend always to be half-full 
rather than half-empty.
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In stark contrast, auditors work-
ing to a separate audit committee 
will tend to concentrate more fierce-
ly on trying to ensure that the ac-
counts on which they are working 
deliver a true and fair view of the 
company being audited. Which is, 
of course, the principal purpose of 
independent accounting. 
Our study did not take place in a 
vacuum but in the context of an im-
pressive body of research and com-
ment on the topic. I believe it points 
to several avenues for future research. 
More research is needed on the costs 
and benefits of decision aids on audi-
tors’ judgment and decision-making, 
particularly on the effects of check-
lists. Such research could examine 
other factors that may play a role in 
how checklist use affects auditors’ 
acceptance of aggressive reporting, 
such as financial incentives or person-
ality characteristics. 
Of course, our study is subject 
to limitations. One limitation re-
lates to the participants in our ex-
periment who all work in the same 
region in the Netherlands and for 
the same Big Four audit firm. As a 
result, it is not possible to fully ex-
clude the possibility that auditors 
in other firms or regions would 
judge differently.
Improving accuracy
Summing up our findings in arguably 
simpler terms, unintended consequenc-
es of the audit process would seem to be 
at work. Our research strongly suggests 
that certain measures taken to improve 
the accuracy of account reporting can in 
fact have an adverse impact on the inde-
pendence of those doing the auditing.
How, then, do we fix aggressive ac-
counting and prevent the problems it 
creates? I've already mentioned the 
limitations of regulation and standardi-
sation in the policing role. Perhaps we 
should pay greater attention to the po-
tential that lies in promoting the use of 
de-biasing techniques.
If I am correct that the key issue is 
awareness, there are ways to help peo-
ple to refocus. Prompt them to think of 
all the possible negatives and inaccu-
racies that you might find in prepara-
tory work. Expect mistakes to have 
been made and consider (motives for) 
possible opportunistic reporting. This 
helps to reinforce the critical mindset 
and prevents succumbing to bias. 
Another solution is to further 
strengthen the role of the independ-
ent audit committee and reduce man-
agement’s influence. This is an essen-
tial part of the journey towards arriving 
at a genuinely objective and fair view 
in the final accounts. 
“If I am correct that the key issue is awareness, 
there are ways to help people to refocus.”
